Contemporary Social Sciences
2019

Number 3

Article 6

2019

Methodology Construction of Euro-American Sinology and
Parallel Study of Comparative Literature

Follow this and additional works at: https://css.researchcommons.org/journal
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
(2019) "Methodology Construction of Euro-American Sinology and Parallel Study of Comparative
Literature," Contemporary Social Sciences: No. 3, Article 6.
Available at: https://css.researchcommons.org/journal/vol2019/iss3/6

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by Contemporary Social Sciences. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Contemporary Social Sciences by an authorized editor of Contemporary Social Sciences.

CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL SCIENCES No.3. 2019

Methodology Construction of EuroAmerican Sinology and Parallel
Study of Comparative Literature
Liu Yunhua*
Abstract:

During the 1950s and 60s, the concept of parallel study of comparative
literature was initiated by US scholars, yet they ignored the construction of
methodology. As a methodological paradigm to compare and study cultural
relations between heterogeneous literary works without factual links, parallel
study has always been under criticism. This paper, however, holds that
whether it is on the history of modern cross-cultural literary exchanges, or it
is on the sprouting practices of Eastern-Western literary comparison, parallel
study has wielded an ineradicable and unavoidable influence. This paper,
after a brief review of and reflection upon the methodology of parallel study,
enumerates several Euro-American sinologists, and classifies their parallel
study methodologies into three categories after in-depth exploration and
discussion. It then points out that parallel study is by no means a field that
overlooks methodology, but rather, its methodology is complicated and boasts
diverse possibilities; the study of the methodology of parallel study is also of
great theoretical importance to the advancement of disciplinary construction
of comparative literature and the Eastern-Western literary comparison.
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1. The birth of parallel study and the problems with its
methodology

T

he concept “parallel study” was proposed by US scholars in the 1950s and
60s, and immediately triggered a long-standing debate between US and
French scholars on what comparative literature is and how to make a comparative
study of literature. For that very part of history, which is quite well known, repetition
here seems unnecessary. US academics like René Wellek and Henry H. H. Remak
listed “literariness” or “aesthetic value” as the central focus and primary task of
* Liu Yunhua, Ph.D. in Comparative Literature, Peking University, researcher, Urban Culture Research Center of Shanghai
Normal University (SHNU), director, professor and Ph.D. supervisor, Comparative and World Literature Program, SHNU,
a national key discipline.
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comparative literature, and in this manner tried to change the too mechanical and rigid theories upheld by earlier
French scholars in aspects such as disciplinary orientation, division of literature territory and methodology
construction. That indeed made some sense, yet it has also to be noted that these US scholars, while dedicating
themselves to the theoretical “synthesis,” generally ignored the methodology construction, and even denied the
existence of distinctive approaches to comparative literature. Among these US scholars, only Owen Aldridge
seemed to somehow notice what parallel study should be based on: comparability. He posed that the parallels
made through the lens of aesthetics tend to emphasize “resemblances or affinities.” Such “analogy without
contact” might lead more attention to the “major works” (note: this term is used to contrast with the “minor
works” which the French scholars valued in their literary comparison) and how they are artistically created.
Yet he added that methodology is not a problem worth too much attention, and compared with the content, the
method is merely a minor aspect①. However, the “historical comparative poetics” advocated during the end of
the 19th century and the mid-20th century by some Russian academics such as Alexander Veselovsk and V.
M. Zhirmunsky, seemed more enlightening for the methodology construction of parallel study, for it advocated
exploring the “typological commonness,” and the deeper reasons for and the rules of the commonness②.
Modern Chinese scholars exhibit two major inclinations in their “parallel study” of Chinese and foreign
literature as well as in the methodology construction of parallel study: first, “compare” or “illustrate” by
seeking commonness and interconnection. For example, Qian Zhongshu, in his Limited Views: Essays on Ideas
and Letters (guan zhui bian), attempted to “interconnect” those literary or poetic phenomena without factual
links, either by sorting out the truths behind tiny details, or by pursuing a certain worth beyond through his
Eastern-Western literary comparison, or by seeking the common literary and poetic cores that are universally
implied. All the while he used a method of “comparison” to break down those “perplexing barriers” existing
between the Chinese and western literary and poetic cores.③ The second inclination of modern Chinese
scholars is to seek differences and heterogeneity through “comparisons.” Examples of this inclination are even
more abundant. In the twilight of the Qing Dynasty, especially after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)
and the Gengzi Incident (the Boxer Rebellion) in 1900, several Chinese scholars armed with a global view
and a profound understanding of Western culture, became fans of the difference-based “comparison.” First
Guo Songtao, Yan Fu, then Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei, then Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi and Lun Xun, just to
name a few. Generally speaking, there was one common assumption in their Chinese-Western comparative
discourses: “Western culture” is superior to its Eastern counterpart.④
①
②
③
④

Aldridge,p. 5
Wu, pp. 27–38; Liu, pp. 250–268.
Qian, p. 496
There are also some exceptions. Some conservatives (who knew little about Western culture) were rigid in mind and blindly xenophobic. Some powerful officials,
such as Xu Tong, Chong Qi and Yun Yuding, boasted about how Chinese culture was superior to Western culture. This assumption was heartily embraced by some
Chinese scholars then, including Liang Qichao, who had undertaken a tour of Europe in 1919, and those representatives of “cultural conservatism,” like Liang
Shuming, Zhang Junmai and Du Yaquan. That was why, at the beginning of the 20th century, Tang Yongtong lamented: It was all very well for “the reformists to
learn from the West.” The “conservatives,” however, also “fell prey to the alien culture.” Though the two bore enmity against each other, they were “unanimous
in worshiping Europe and US as an idol” (Tang, p. 21; also see Luo, 2001, pp. 28-100). Yet the author believes that, compared with the radical theories pursuing
indiscriminate Westernization, those conservative cultural views indicated evident progress in the understanding about the connotation and methods of and
attitude to the relationship between the Chinese and Western cultures. Since the 1920s, one marked response Chinese literati had made to World War I and Liang
Qichao’s Impressions of a Voyage to Europe was the rising of the “Eastern Cultural School” (forming the majority of the later “cultural conservatives”), which
was marked by a “consciousness” of Eastern culture. This school was generally made up of erudite scholars that knew both Eastern and Western cultures well.
While able to distinguish between the sharp differences, they never blindly opposed or degraded Western culture. Thus they either proposed mutual compatibility
and complementarity between Western and Eastern cultures, or advocated multi-dimensional co-existence of the two. Their attitude towards the relationships
between the two, compared with the “indiscriminate Westernization” activists (such as Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi), or the “stubborn conservatives” (represented by
Gu Hongming), appeared more tolerant, rational and objective, revealing a kind of “wisdom in adjusting and mediating.”
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There is also an inclination in between that strives for a harmonious co-existence of similarities
and differences, which is represented by academics like Ye Weilian, the author of Comparative Poetics:
A Discussion of Theoretic Frameworks. While insisting on pursuing common aesthetic rules and grounds
through comparison, Ye made it clear that Chinese and Western literature/culture must always “identify their
similarities and differences” through “mutual reflection, comparison, analogy and understanding.” As the
saying goes, “Differences might indicate commonness, just as the void might breed forms of life,” “similarities”
and “differences,” “this” and “that” are contrary yet auxiliary to each other. “That” is an “inseparable”
partner of “this”①. However, Ye’s study and methodology are rarely seen in practice, and do not belong to the
mainstream parallel study of Chinese-Western comparative literature.
This paper holds that, “parallel study,” whether it aims to “seek commonness” or to “identify differences,”
is to a large degree viewed by scholars in and out of China as something intimidating or insignificant. The
general opinion among academics is that its “credibility” is dubious. As early as 1932, Chen Yinque, a master
of traditional Chinese culture, proposed that the “comparison between Chinese and foreign literature” must
be limited to those topics such as “how poets like Bai Juyi influenced Chinese and Japanese literature, or
how Buddhist stories influenced Indian or Chinese literature and how these literatures evolved in history,”
for only these topics “fell in with the core of comparative study.” Moreover, they touched on the “concepts of
historical evolution and systematic differences / similarities.” Conversely, these propositions such as “Homer
is comparable to Qu Yuan, Confucius is comparable to Goethe and ancient culture to modern culture,” or
even “anything from Chinese culture can bear some analogy to something from another culture,” often came
from unconvincing analogy and absurd reasoning, and could not withstand scrutiny. What’s worse, in that
case, “Chinese culture might totally surrender to its foreign counterpart, or have its own pedigrees disrupted”
and “there is no possibility for study”②. In other words, Chen believed that parallel study was not by any
means “credible.” Some scholars of modern times point out that “parallel study” is prone to fall into the trap
of “polarized thinking,” arbitrary generalization, oversimplification and thus disregard for the diversity inside
one culture, thereby causing misjudgment about values and “false interpretation of cultural peculiarities”③. In
some sense those views voice the basic concerns the academic circle generally has for parallel study. A veteran
scholar in comparative literature, whom the author respects a great deal, once even asserted during a private
meeting with the author that “parallel study is a false proposition and pseudostudy” (To respect privacy, the
name of the scholar is kept anonymous here).
History is complicated. As early as the late Ming Dynasty, when Western culture began to enter China,
“parallel study” between Chinese and Western culture had already sprouted. By the late Qing Dynasty
and the early years of the period of the Republic of China, China had modeled the framework for its great
“self-reconstruction” almost completely on the Western paradigm. “Parallel study” had made ineradicable
contributions to China’s transformation from “an old self” to “a new self” then, but surely it was a rough and
abstract kind of parallel study.Tang Yongtong, as early as the 1920s, had criticized Liang Qichao’s Impressions
of a Voyage to Europe and Liang Shuming’s Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies as “superficial

① Ye, p. 15, 24.
② Chen, pp. 251–252
③ Meng, pp. 143–156
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tunnel vision.” He argued that these studies “abused analogies to seek commonness, yet while identifying
differences tended to overidolize a certain culture and excessively degrade another,” and embodied the “decline”
of the academics and the culture①. His criticism, however, did not respect the fact, for these studies in fact
implied several new attempts at methodology construction, which, unfortunately, were ignored. For example,
Liang Shuming once noted that the parallel study between Chinese, Western and Indian culture must be based
upon the “cause-and-effect relationships” existing among the three civilizations, and must not be limited to a
mere listing for comparison②. Liang was among those who for the first time realized that parallel study and
influence study are in fact inseparable from and interdependent of each other. This, the author believes, is of
great theoretical significance.
Generally speaking, however, the “superficial tunnel vision,” Tang Yongtong alarmed one hundred years
ago, is still commonly seen in the field of Chinese-Western cultural comparison. The fact that scholars are
lacking in understanding about language and in knowledge is one reason. The other reason is the deficient
methodology of parallel study. Specifically, besides the aforementioned “polarized thinking” problem, the
cross-border comparison between Chinese and Western literary theories is also plagued by the inundation
of too abstract comparisons that might lead to dubious conclusions, as well as the disregard for tracing the
origins of terms and concepts, thereby ending up in a muddle of cognitive uncertainty. Surely, to rectify the
“superficial tunnel vision,” one must find a suitable remedy. Language and knowledge accumulation really
matters but needs take a long time. Compared with them, methodology construction could in reality bring
more immediate improvement to the parallel study. On this point, the Euro-American sinologists have served
as very good examples.

2. Methodology construction of Euro-American sinology and parallel study of
comparative literature
Comparative methodology of Euro-American sinology in nature mainly belongs to “parallel study.”
A rational, objective and dialectical attempt to elucidate, criticize and summarize according to these
representative methods will not only advance methodology construction during China-West cultural
dialogues, but also will provide inspiration for the innovation and improvement of the disciplinary theories of
comparative literature.
This paper will tentatively explore some Euro-American sinological works which focus on Chinese
classics and have constructed some unique parallel study methods. Generally, these works can be divided into
three categories. First, comparative study, represented by the “Trilogy of The Comparison between Chinese
and Western Thoughts,” authored by David L. Hall and Roger Ames, F. Jullien’s Detour and Access: Strategies
of Meaning in China and Greece, The Impossible Nude: Chinese Art and Western Aesthetics and Found the Morality:
Mencius’ Dialogues with the Enlightenment Philosophers, as well as Early China/Ancient Greece: Thinking
through Comparisons, co-authored by Steven Shankman and Stephen W. Durrant. Second, interpretation
and study of Chinese classics/thoughts/culture in the framework of Western propositions, paradigms and

① Tang, pp. 20–23.
② Liang, p. 25
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ideological patterns, which is represented by Jacques Gernet, Benjamin Schwartz, Benjamin Elman, Chad
Hansen, and James Liu. John K. Fairbank, Joseph R. Levenson and Paul A. Cohen also made contributions
to this category by their “shock and reaction” theory, “the traditional and the modern” theory and “Chinacentralism” theory, which they used to study and interpret the fission and evolution of Chinese culture during
the late Qing Dynasty. Third, systematic interpretation of Chinese classics/thoughts/culture through a certain
consciousness of problematics, which is represented by sinologists such as Richard Wilhelm, Marcel Granet,
Joseph Needham, Angus Graham and Roger Ames, who focused on “correlative thinking” when they tried
to define the essence of Chinese thoughts in a series of discussions. There are also William T. De Bary and
Thomas A. Metzger, who studied Confucianism or Neo-Confucianism through the lens of the “consciousness
of predicament.” Given the limitations of space and time, this paper could not give an all-round detailed
presentation here. Rather, this paper will, based on the individual contributions of some sinologists, briefly
analyze their parallel study methods as they fall into the three categories mentioned above.
The author believes that the three types of sinology mentioned above have led to three approaches for
parallel study: a method that takes on the path of polarity comparison, a method that centers on a certain
proposition, paradigm or framework of interpretation, and a method that proceeds from problematics. Surely
there are overlapping areas among the three (some sinologists might adopt all three methods simultaneously),
yet each sinologist also has his/her own inclination. This paper will mainly revolve around the three
approaches and analyze individual cases which adopt them.
2.1 The method of polarity comparison: represented by David L. Hall, Roger Ames and F. Jullien
The premise of the method of polarity comparison is that Chinese culture and Western culture are
completely different, namely, they vary sharply in their views about the origin of the universe, the relationship
between heaven and man, core values, the thinking mode, and the explanation for change and development.
A most common practice of this method in Chinese-Western cultural comparison is to select a character, a
concept or a proposition from the cultural or literary classic works of both sides, and then compare them.
Yet due to the disregard for the influence that environment, times, languages, nationalities and authors
themselves exert on the research objects, the conclusions always end up too abstract and lacking in objectivity
and credibility. Some sinologists, however, seemed to find a more objective approach, for they abandoned
the direct analogy or comparison between propositions, concepts or characters selected from the culture as
a whole. Instead, they incorporated the concepts/propositions in question into a context, paid attention to the
point/side or major/minor relationship between certain concepts/propositions and other relevant concepts. In
that manner they not only performed “contextualization,” but also touched on methods of phylogenetics and
genealogy that pursue cause-and-effect relationships. David L. Hall, Roger Ames and F. Jullien are exemplars
of this method.
First, David L. Hall and Roger Ames①. The works on the study of Chinese philosophy and culture they
have co-authored since the 1980s, especially the “Trilogy of The Comparison between Chinese and Western
Thoughts,”② have caused an uproar among international academics. Those works use substantial comparative
① Liu, 2013, pp. 146–156
② The trilogy includes Thinking through Confucius (1987), Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture (1995) and
Thinking through Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (1998). All three books have been published by the State Univ. of New
York Press.
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cultural methods. According to David L. Hall and Roger Ames, research into Chinese culture shall draw on
the “arscontextualis (skills of contextualization),” yet “polarity comparison” never ceases as the research into
Chinese and Western culture continues.
Their major opinion includes: first, the Chinese explanation of the origin of the universe is completely
different from that of the West, hence there are two different modes of ideological/cultural construction and
different connotations/characteristics for it. On the whole, Chinese culture is “nontranscendental.” It uses
“correlative thinking” when handling the intertwining relationships between heaven, man and the world,
and achieves an “aesthetic order (world).” Chinese culture belongs to the “First Problematic Thinking.” If it
is mechanically “defined” by the Western transcendental binary opposition and “cause-and-effect logic,” i.e.
the “Second Problematic Thinking,” then not only misunderstanding but also “rubbish” and “barriers” might
be created, which will block the path to a better understanding of Chinese culture. So, what is the right path
towards Chinese culture? David L. Hall and Roger Ames held that the key was “contextualization.” What is
contextualization then? Placing the research objects (“elements of culture” or “important propositions” in the
two scholars’ eyes①) in a “focus/field” context and emphasizing the nonessentialized interaction between the
two. This is an understanding about “aesthetics,” “narration” and “sympathy.” Western culture is well known
for its tradition of using “contextualization” to explain the generation of meaning, yet David L. Hall and Roger
Ames argued that contextualization accompanies the cause-and-effect logic and reasoning of essentialism all
the time. In response to the phenomenon that some sinologists widely apply this logic to their interpretation
of Chinese culture, David L. Hall and Roger Ames firmly oppose the “logicalization” or “essentialization” of
problems concerning Chinese culture.
The second viewpoint David L. Hall and Roger Ames stressed is that, while classifying Chinese culture
and Western culture into two different frameworks, namely the “First Problematic Thinking” and the “Second
Problematic Thinking,” it is also necessary to highlight their respective “counter-discourses.” “Counterdiscourses” are minor discourses that are different from or even contrary to the mainstream discourses.
The appearance of “counter-discourses” indicates that the development of a certain culture is by no means
linear. Rather, it boasts considerable diversity and a resilience that necessarily follows. The ups and downs, or
even the disappearance and survival of “counter-discourses” (for example, the School of Names of Chinese
philosophy never took center stage in Chinese history, and tragedies are rarely seen in Chinese literature)
are helpful in revealing the quality and characteristics of the mainstream discourses and are thus worth deep
exploration. The “counter-discourses” in Chinese culture, such as the views of the School of Names of Chinese
philosophy during the pre-Qin period, Zhuangzi’s skepticism, and Hetuvidya of Buddhism during the Sui and
Tang Dynasties, all attached great importance to the logical elucidation of conceptions, Nāma and nimitta. The
“counter-discourses” in Western culture, such as the proposition that “ever-present change is the fundamental
essence of the universe,” which was upheld by Greek philosopher Heraclitus (approximately 540–480 BC),
and the “continuity of matter②” proposed by Anaxagoras (500–428 BC), as well as the “nomos” that was

① David L. Hall and Roger Ames named these key elements or propositions “cultural determinants.” They were formulated during the axial period of Chinese
and Western culture (in the West, before St. Augustine; in China, pre-Qin period and the Han Dynasty), and were always “present” in the advancement of
Chinese and Western culture and exerted their due influence (Hall & Ames, 1995, xvi-xvii).
② It means all the substances, from very tiny bits to the universe, are a mixture of a certain number of ingredients (or “seeds”). The nature and form of the
ingredients predominating in number will decide the nature and form of a substance (the ingredients themselves never change or move)
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formed in the wake of sages’ attention to the art of debate, were more often than not against essentialism,
or preferred poetic-style speeches that were highly marked with metaphors, allegories and paradoxes. They
wielded a big influence on the West. Nonetheless, as “philosophy” won in its battle against “poetry,” which
was waged by Plato in an elaborately-designed drama, as “theory” (the most essential part of it is physics
and “metaphysics constituting the main body of “philosophy”) still topped the values within the structure of
knowledge established by Aristotle, they were finally marginalized as “counter-discourses” in ancient Western
intellectual history.
David L. Hall and Roger Ames also noticed the dynamic evolution of problems themselves. Specifically
speaking, the connotation and representation of any concept or proposition, as an outcome of coordination
among relevant elements under certain circumstances, will naturally change if the circumstances change.
Therefore, historicism is necessary when the elements and dimensions of problems are reviewed; moreover,
“discourses” and “counter-discourses” might reverse roles under certain circumstances. David L. Hall and
Roger Ames’ understanding and interpretation of Chinese culture prove enlightening even for Chinese
scholars, thus they not only are viewed as leaders of North American sinology, but also have won the heart-felt
respect of Chinese scholars. Their success is to a large extent attributed to the effective methods they adopted.
Next comes F. Jullien①. It has to be recognized that Jullien is an ambitious scholar with his own set of
methods. He insisted that there was something wrong with the foundation of the building of Western culture,
and new strengthening work was needed. Or in his own words, Western thoughts needed to be “re-catégoriser
(re-categorized).” However, the “re-categorization” project could not be completed by the West itself, for
“interpreting the West’s culture in the Western environment,” though seeming to “gain a direct access,” is
in fact “murmuring to itself,” and is almost unlikely to usher in refreshing changes and progress. Therefore,
this “re-categorization” project that goes “backward” must make “detours” around “another culture” and be
implemented under the gaze of “another culture.” That means Western thinkers must “leave their homeland”
again and to “penser autrement (think elsewhere).” The “self” and the “other” based on Hegel’s “all-inclusive”
absolute reason are merely an imaginary version of the West-centralism and essentialism. This “other,” as the
opposite side of the “self,” is in fact the other “self,” rather than a real “other.” Jullien held that for the West,
this very “other” “lying elsewhere” could be none other than “China.” “China,” as the “l’impensé (a state of
mind simply cannot arise within its own pattern)” of the West, had a connotation that went far beyond what
the West could imagine. It could overthrow the Western “word/object” relationship most effectively, thereby
toppling the foundation of Western thoughts and the universally-cherished vision in the West.Jullien also
considered Chinese and Western culture to be completely different from each other. According to him, the
“differences” between the two were where “comparison” or even a “comparative system” should start, while
at the same time they also served as a reminder of the traps that interpretative methods, such as interlingual
translation, might fall into; “differences” are impossible to be erased, nor should they be: it is “differences”
that ensure the “distance” and “validity” of the “vis-à-vis (face-to-face)” meeting of the two cultures, and the
“translation” that seems reliable might in fact murder “differences” when dissolving the “distance” ②. Jullien’s
works, though basing the parallel study between Chinese and Western culture upon their “differences,” rarely

① Liu, 2014, pp. 40–53
② Jullien & Marchaise, pp. 129–135, 168–206
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made absurd, vague conclusions. Instead, they were full of in-depth individual insights that highlighted the
peculiarities of the two cultures. In that sense, Jullien’s parallel study methods are definitely worth deeper
exploration.
2.2 Methods that center on a certain proposition or interpretative framework: represented by John
K. Fairbank, Joseph R. Levenson and Jacques Gernet
The method refers to the parallel study between Chinese and Western thoughts that is conducted based on
a certain paradigm, proposition or interpretative framework. Unlike the one above, this method, in appearance,
undertakes direct interpretation of Chinese culture, yet meanwhile it also retains Chinese-Western cultural
comparisons, visible or not, here and there. Studies launched by John K. Fairbank, Joseph R. Levenson and
Jacques Gernet are good examples of this methodology.
Around World War II, when American sinology sprouted, developed and evolved, methodology was
always a key problem. It can be said that each change and progress of American sinology around this period
was mainly marked by a renovation of methodology. This characteristic was in line with John K. Fairbank’s
proposal that “each kind of social science” should be used as an “area-study approach” for studying Chinese
history① (In contrast, the traditional sinology which limits itself to historical and linguistic documents is rigid
in methodology).
John K. Fairbank is undoubtedly one of the sinologists that have been most respected by modern Chinese
scholars. The “shock-reaction” model he used in interpreting transformations of modern Chinese history,
and his insightful view of “tributary system/treaty system” “ubiquitous sovereignty” and “China and other
countries being concentric circles,” was highly influential in the West and drew wide attention from Chinese
scholars. However, his contribution to the parallel study between Chinese and Western culture, especially to
the understanding of the concrete differences between the two, has rarely been summarized by scholars. The
truth is that all John K. Fairbank’s studies of Chinese history and culture were conducted in the big framework
of Chinese-Western cultural comparison. The “modernization” standards he used to evaluate the progressions
of Chinese and Western history and culture were heavily tainted with West-centralism, yet a lot of his views
were, and are still enlightening today. The majority of his views go:②
First, though in earlier history China was an “Eastern-style” society, Fairbank did not regard its
development as unchanging, iron-like, or “super-stable.” Instead, he viewed its development as an everprogressing process. When speaking of Chinese monarchy, for example, he stressed the supremacy of the
monarchical power, and noticed that ever since the Han and Tang Dynasties, the monarchical power did not
reach below counties, and local affairs were in fact entrusted to the gentry. There is another example: when
talking about the legitimacy of private enterprises, on the one hand, he did not agree with some other Western
scholars viewing the East as “despotism” (they insisted that China had never established the legitimacy
of private enterprises), and on the other hand, he acknowledged that Chinese capitalism was all the time
plagued by underdevelopment, and merchants ranked very low on the social ladder. Quite the contrary, in
the West, ever since ancient Greece, city-states or cities had been controlled by the propertied class (mainly
① Fairbank, 1983, xiv.
② The following five viewpoints can be found in John K. Fairbank’s China: Tradition and Transformation (Revised Edition). (Trans. Zhang Pei et al. Beijing: World
Knowledge Press, 2002), The Great Chinese Revolution, 1900-1985 (Trans. Liu Zunqi, Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2000) and The United States and China
(4th edition, enlarged) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983). The details will not be enumerated here.
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merchants), who manipulated the government and went out of their way to prevent any sign of an independent
bureaucracy.
Second, in China, family, rather than the individual, was the unit of society. In China, the family was a
miniature of the country. The head (father) of the family was the supreme dictator. He was allowed by the law
to sell his children and even execute a defiant son. Along with that came filial duty and compliance, which
were considered to be the major part of moral practice and virtue. In accordance with its Yin-Yang cosmology,
China established a hierarchy within the family and within society, in which each member was appointed
to a certain position and committed to certain moral responsibilities so as to make sure that their work was
interactive and well coordinated.
Third, Chinese politics was fundamentally based on Confucian principles. Fairbank held that without a
deep understanding of the Confucian thoughts and traditions, no one could understand Mao Zedong or Jiang
Jieshi. Confucius’ voice could even be heard in the “Marx-Mao Zedong duet played in Beijing” nowadays①.
In terms of the law, Fairbank thought that Chinese legal conceptions were based on the rule of heaven (the
order of nature). Only people who could restrain their behavior during moral cultivation and practices were
following this rule of heaven. Any breach of the rule of heaven would be a moral, but not a legal problem.
Chinese people did not view the laws as something external and absolute. Nor did they admit the “higher
laws” are bestowed upon them by a divine god (such as the god-given “Ten Commandments” in Christianity
and other commandments from Jehovah or Jesus). This peculiarity of Chinese law, on the one hand, prevented
binary opposition (opposition always incurs difficult choices and tensions) between the divine and the vulgar,
between god and man, yet on the other hand, it made the law less independent and less dignified. In the old
China, the law, the binding power for contracts and private enterprises had never achieved a “holy trinity,”
therefore the old China could never be called a “modern” country.
Fourth, China’s nationalism was closely linked with its culture. Hence, the conquest by an alien ethnicity
was acceptable for the nationalists of China—if only the alien ethnicity accepted the Confucian morality. This
could explain Chinese tradition of “synarchy”②. In the West, however, things were different. Nationalism was
tangled up with politics, thus even countries (such as Germany and France) sharing the same cultural basis
(Christianity) could constantly wage wars against each other.
Fifth, there were marked differences between China and the West in their understanding of the man-nature
relationship: in the West, nature or the other creatures served as either the men’s background or opponents
(to be conquered by men at last); in China (as well as other Eastern countries), however, man was viewed
as a mere part of nature that depended on nature. Man and nature were not opponents. Such a contrast was
also shown in culture: in Western religions, man and God were the same in nature and form, thus Christian
paintings always focused on people; Western portraits often placed people in the foreground and scenery in
the background (for example, the ancient Italian paintings were finished by drawing a figure first, and then
adding some scenery to decorate), while ancient Chinese landscape paintings tended to portray figure as a tiny
and even insignificant stroke beside a forbidding cliff.

① Fairbank,1983, pp. 53–55
② Fairbank, 2002, p. 449.
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Joseph R. Levenson, Fairbank’s student, contributed new content to Fairbank’s interpretative framework. In
his famous book Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China, Levenson added the dimension of “emotion”
to the conflicts between (Chinese) history and (Western) values, thereby causing complex tensions and even
“fission” between the two. His most well-known proposition, inspired by Liang Qichao’s experiences, which
went “seeing the value of other countries, a person with a rational mind might avert from the culture of his
motherland; yet influenced by history, he is always connected to his motherland by an emotional bound”①,
proved highly influential among posterity. In his three-volume Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, Levenson
expanded his proposition and used it to interpret all the paradoxes encountered by China in modern times: the
East and the West, the history and the value, the traditional and the modern, the conservative and the radical,
and the nation and the world. His binary thinking in interpretation reminded scholars after him that, between
the late Qing Dynasty and the early years of the period of the Republic of China (or the “era of transformation”),
a number of pioneers of the New Culture Movement had in fact wavered between “two contradictory
inclinations”②, or even among “multiple contradictory inclinations” ③. Moreover, Levenson’s binary thinking,
which exuded a vehement sense of crisis, and his profound, persevering ideological exploration, as well as
his contradictory yet peculiarly charming expressions, intrigued a large number of luminaries in the West④.
Evidently, however, this “excessive” obsession might easily backfire: Paul A. Cohen, another student of John
K. Fairbank, openly challenged his teacher and Levenson in his book Discovering History in China: American
Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past. His move was triggered by the new spirit of the time then (such
as the doubting voices against Western ethnocentrism and imperialist hegemony during the Vietnam War and
inside the Euro-American academia itself). In addition, the dilemmas caused by Fairbank and Levenson’s
disregard for the internal elements of China and their functions (which the “internal approach” emphasized⑤)
in their interpretation were also part of the reason. Academic works remarking on Cohen’s new approach and
influence abound in China, yet given the limitation of space here, no more details will be given. ⑥
At the beginning of the 1980s, Jacques Gernet, in honor of the 400th anniversary of Matteo Ricci arrival
in China, wrote the book China and the Christian Impact (first published in 1982). Fairbank’s influence was
evident in this book, yet Jacques Gernet further expounded on the concrete embodiments of the “shock and
reaction” theory from the perspective of the relationship among language, culture, thinking and reality. He
used the linguistic propositions of Emile Benveniste, a famous French linguist, as methodological support
to process the relationship among language, thinking and reality. According to Emile Benveniste, language
“establishes and organizes the content and means of our imagination.” In the Indo-European language system,
there is an “all-inclusive” word -- être (be), which has an “essential meaning” in Indo-European thought and
philosophy: “The West has been seeking ‘être’ all through its history by exploring superficial phenomenon.”
In contrast, the Chinese language does not have “those characteristics that belong to the category of grammar,”

①
②
③
④
⑤

1986, p. 4.
Zhang, pp. 134–152, pp. 200–226.
Luo, 2002, pp. 24–28
Gao, 2010, pp. 82–87; 1990, pp. 39–46.
Lin Tongqi summed up Cohen’s “internal approach” in four connotations: paying attention to the internal elements of Chinese society, viewing the source of
and impetus for modern “changes” of China from inside, taking on an “insider” perspective, and adopting the “method of empathy” (Lin, pp. 60-70)..
⑥ What’s worth mentioning is that John K. Fairbank in his latter works evidently assimilated Cohen’s thoughts, and sincerely reflected upon the practices of “using
Western theories to interpret the Chinese culture” conducted by him and the mainstream American academia (Hou, pp. 108-119).
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as a result, the word “être” can never find an equivalent in Chinese, whereby it becomes “not convenient” for
Chinese to express nouns such as “existence” and “substance.” In Chinese and its like, the border between
the “truth” (Being/God/Soul/Reason/Logos) and its “embodiment” (beings/body/flesh/perception) is largely
blurred. In addition, unlike Western languages, Chinese is not able to directly show through linguistic forms
the differences of abstract/concrete, feminine/masculine or other differences in elements like the tense and
the person. In a word, Chinese is a language unfavorable for logical thinking. Understanding the differences
between Chinese and Western languages, Jacques Gernet pointed out that the Chinese people in the Ming and
Qing Dynasties in fact did not, and could not, truly understand the meaning of “God,” “Heaven,” “immortality
of the soul” in Christianity and the “revelation of truth” concerning them, for after all, the Chinese language
felt awkward as a means to express Western “truth”①.
Jacques Gernet’s another book L’intelligence de la Chine: Le Social et Le Mental (The Intelligence of China:
The Social and the Mental) analyzed China by comparing the marked differences between China and the West,
for example, Chinese people did not pay attention to the division between public and private space, preferred
reconciliation to fighting, emphasized mutual complementarity of contrary sides rather than confrontation,
liked texts better than voices, and tended to think instinctively rather than logically②. Responses to his study
of Chinese thoughts and culture possibly varied, yet his keen insight has undoubtedly been widely recognized.
This indicates that the approach to comparing Chinese and Western culture through the lens of the relationship
between language, culture, thinking and reality is feasible and worth recommendation.
2.3 Methods that proceed from problematics: represented by Thomas A. Metzger and William T.
De Bary
The “consciousness of predicament” of Thomas A. Metzger and William T. De Bary is used here as
an example, because the “predicament of Confucianism” and the question how China could “get out of the
predicament” had haunted them for a lifetime. As is known, Confucianism sank into a deep predicament
as China went through dramatic changes. Joseph R. Levenson insisted that without its political patron,
Confucianism was doomed to “end up in museums,” where it would be removed from the vividness of daily
moral life, be preserved as “an antique,” or become a “wandering ghost” never seeing the way out③.
Many scholars have concerns about the predicament of Confucianism in modern times, yet few
behave like Metzger, who set the “consciousness of predicament” as a perspective to study Confucianism.
According to Metzger, “The best way to know a group of people is to figure out what is bothering them.”
For Confucianism at different stages of the late Chinese empire, “a deep-rooted, psychological sense
of predicament, discontent and disharmony of existence” was of “primary importance.” It far outpaced
“instrumental anxieties” concerning wealth and power④. “Consciousness of problematics” is a synonym for
“consciousness of predicaments.” Only when one’s body or mind suffers frustration, depression and anxiety
can “problems” be realized. However, Metzger’s “consciousness of problematics” mainly targeted those
influential figures in Euro-American sinology, such as John K. Fairbank, Joseph R. Levenson and Max

①
②
③
④
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Weber. In short, he opposed Fairbank and Levenson’s approach to study China by placing the traditional and
the modern in binary opposition, for in that manner the two would reject, exclude and antagonize each other,
thereby incurring a mechanical, one-sided “partial understanding” of the relationship between Chinese people
and their traditional culture. In that case, research would not be revealing but obscuring the nature of the
problem①. Max Weber, however, insisted that compared with the intense tensions and confrontations Puritans
felt between the world and themselves, Confucianism treated the world with “naivety.” It made efforts to
reduce the tensions between man and the “world” to an absolute minimum in Confucian China, there was
never a strained relationship between people and the “world,” for there was never a God that transcended
the vulgar world, expostulated on morality or made moral prophecies. Nor was there a “spiritual” substitute
(the prophet) who sought to enlighten people and kept the solemn vows (made to God). Confucianism,
lacking a Christian-like sense of fighting against the “evil” inside oneself and in the world, naturally failed to
provide ideological support for revolutions②. It is clear that Metzger’s consciousness of the “predicament” for
Confucianism mainly resulted from his negation of Weber’s negation. In this manner he also brought Fairbank
and Levenson’s “traditional and modern” comparison pattern into a more complicated elucidation platform
where the relationships between the public and the private, between the interior and the exterior, between the
explicit and the implicit, between the rule of heaven and the desires of man, and between the ideal and the real,
had triggered conflicts, anxiety and even fear among the Confucian scholars. Metzger held that “Confucianism
will be meaningless, if it ignores the universal background of moral decay that includes the internal destructive
power coming from one’s selfishness”③. In fact, the contradictions between the ideal and the real, the conflicts
between individual desire and universal morality had all the while accompanied Confucianism since its
birth. Those conflicts and the “consciousness of predicament” they aroused also inspired the “metaphysical
superstructure”④ proposed by Neo-Confucianism as it developed from the Song Dynasty to modern times.
The ideal of Confucianism followers originated from their understanding of the pure will of the universe (the
mandate of heaven, the natural order of heaven and the principle of heaven) and the construction of morality.
They attempted to use morality as a tool to rule, to transform the “world” and the “heart” of men, and finally
to achieve individual and communal success by respecting the rules of the universe. Yet the whole process was
also accompanied by the tensions and anxiety within “man himself” and between the “self” and the morally
decaying “world,” and by the Confucian practitioners’ spontaneous “caution about and fear of misconduct”
and their “relentless” effort to “tear themselves apart” (to negate and struggle against the “evil” coming from
selfish desires and the vulgar world)⑤. It was the very “consciousness of predicament” of Confucianism,
Metzger held, that gave rise to the “tensions” within the minds of Confucianism followers, including NeoConfucianism followers, thereby forming the strong internal power that made revolutions possible.
William T. De Bary continued with the topic of “consciousness of predicament.” In his book The Trouble
with Confucianism (first published in 1991), he conducted further research into the historical predicament of
modern Confucianism -- surely he always acknowledged that Confucianism was living in a “predicament.”
①
②
③
④

Metzger, pp. 9, 16–17.
Weber, pp. 227–229.
38.
There is no precise Chinese word for “metaphysical superstructure” (Metzger, p. 53). Though Metzger claimed that he valued this structure very much, it never
became De Bary’s focus (Metzger, pp. 54-55).
⑤ Metzger, pp. 47–154
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He searched wide-ranging Chinese and Western documents and summed up the reasons for the “predicament”
from four aspects -- “heaven, the emperor, the virtuous men and the ordinary people.” According to De
Bary, the virtuous men in the Confucian tradition were similar to the prophets in the Old Testament, for as
individuals they could gain direct access to the “morality,” the supreme value; they could also admonish the
rulers for or warn the rulers against going against the will of heaven and thus incurring disasters; their holy
sense of mission and power originated from their role as an intermediary between man and God. This “herolike” or “prophet-like” role was in fact not a whim of Confucianism, but rather, it was typical of the Confucian
tradition.① Yet the differences between the virtuous men in Confucianism and the Western prophets are
evident. In Confucianism, “heaven” was never a man-like god that directly intervened in history, or “spoke”
to everybody, “made covenants” and pledged to keep his promises, as is portrayed in Christianity. Thus, none
of the virtuous men or the ordinary people (the entire nation) would have a sense of direct responsibility and
mission for “heaven.” At last, the Confucian virtuous men, neither effectively entrusted by ordinary people,
nor gaining religious support from “heaven,” were doomed to struggle between the ordinary people and the
imperial autocracy. In that sense, the political and moral responsibility Confucianism placed on the shoulder of
the virtuous men -- “making sagacious kings and cultivating moral people,” seemed unbearable. That was the
biggest predicament that the Confucian virtuous men encountered in history②.
In terms of Chinese-Western cultural comparison, De Bary, based on the definition of “liberty” given by
US scholar Charles Frankel and in Webster’s New International Dictionary, proposed that “liberty” refers to a
“humanitarian value” shared by China and the West, and set “liberty” as a basic standard for his comparative
study. According to De Bary, measured by the standard of “liberty,” Confucius was not only a “conservative,”
but also a “liberal,” as he used the ideals and exemplars of the past to criticize the institutional systems of his
time. He was definitely what Gilbert Murray named “a role model in the practice of embracing two different
thoughts.” The scholars of Neo-Confucianism, on the contrary, did well in “toleration” and advocated “natural
state, self-reliance, and self-responsibility.” They were closer to Western “individualism” and “liberalism”③.
Those views, however, said little about the fact that Chinese culture and Western culture varied sharply
in terms of “liberty” and “personality.” That was possibly because the very place where De Bary gave his
speech was the supreme headquarters of Neo-Confucianism: TCA College. In the book The Trouble with
Confucianism, however, conflicts and differences were consciously highlighted, for example, De Bary defined
a Confucian individual as a “moral personality,” rather than an “independent individual” in the West. He held
that the Confucian society, unlike the law-based “civil society” in the West, was made of “ritual communities;”
Confucianism pursued an integration of rituals, morality and practice, rather than the reification (the public
interest) of the public value (the common good). He was essentially saying that Confucianism could not escape
its fate of “predicament.” This bondage, however, in its turn enhanced “Chinese people’s determination to get
out of the predicament and their will to survive,” which showed that it was not necessarily negative④. In the
works of sinologists like Metzger and De Bary, the traces of Christianity and Judaism were easily found when
the authors were interpreting Chinese culture. The “counter-measures” they prescribed for the “predicament”
①
②
③
④
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of China were also influenced by the elements of deep-rooted Jewish and Christian culture.

3. Conclusion
According to Gernet, Europeans could hardly equal the Chinese and Japanese when it comes to the
study of Chinese or Eastern culture, but their study has its own value. So, what is the value? First, European
sinology is of a “comparative nature.” Comparison improves the understanding of differences and the deeper
exploration into how those differences are developed. Second, comparison also convinces people that, at some
point, those paths that follow certain directions will prove better (The study of cultural differences must not
deny the factual superiority of a certain culture)①.
Gernet makes a point. Euro-American sinology is helpful for methodology construction, namely that
it provides luminous ideas for how to conduct cross-cultural comparisons between Chinese and Western
culture/literature. Theoretically, the gap between cultures is impossible to be “bridged,” and the complete
“dissolution of boundaries between cultures” is an “insurmountable task.” However, one thing is certain: the
theoretical deduction based on an abstract premise and a priori logic could by no means negate the value of
real or practical actions. Take the aforementioned “self” reconstruction of China in modern times for example,
the Chinese-Western “parallel study,” despite a large number of misunderstandings, did prove helpful.
Another example is Zeno’s famous “Dichotomy Paradox:” according to the theoretically irrefutable premises
presupposed by Zeno (for example, the distance from A to B is infinitely dividable and people cannot pass an
infinite number of dots within a finite amount of time), motion is impossible; yet the truth is that one can easily
walk from A to B②. Therefore, the value of practices in the imperfect empirical world must not be negated by
a supposition inferred from a perfect priori condition.
To sum up, the sinologists mentioned above have made important contributions to the methodology
construction of the parallel study of comparative literature. Their contributions could be summarized as follows:
First, parallel study is never a field that ignored methods. In the 1950s and 60s, scholars like René Wellek
and Henry H. H. Remak made light of the methodology construction of parallel study and denied the existence
of unique methods in comparative literature. Their opinion still predominates in the mainstream realm of
comparative literature at home and abroad. Yet the sinologists mentioned above, by means of their studies,
reveal that the methodology of parallel study is a field full of complexity with a diversity of possibilities, and
its validity directly influences the understanding and interpretation of a research object.
Second, specifically speaking, parallel study must not just select a proposition, concept or character
from the culture as a whole, and then make direct and abstract analogies or comparisons. Instead, it must
incorporate the concept or proposition into a context or a framework and pay attention to the point/side or
major/minor relationships between certain concept/proposition and other relevant concepts/propositions. This
approach is not only about “contextualization,” but also belongs to “phylogenetics and genealogy.”
① Gernet, 2004, p. 3
② In the mainstream Western realm of thought, the world of logic of Transcendentalism and the world of actions of Empiricism have always been placed in binary
opposition. Their contradiction was not fundamentally addressed until phenomenologists (including Martin Heidegger) introduced the new “Existentialism”
(View on Truth). Their approach was in fact like the traditional Chinese method which integrated the internal and the external, and harmonized the abstract and
the concrete. But surely there were evident differences, for example, Heidegger also stressed how the “external” and “concrete” could negate and obscure the
“internal” and the “abstract,” while Chinese scholars inclined more to the more “explicit,” positive result.
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Third, parallel study must avoid leveraging a certain abstract theoretical model to form peremptory judgments
about Chinese and Western culture. Instead, the internal circumstances of a culture must be fully considered
during the parallel study, and the comparative study of a problem must be based on a perusal of the original text as
well as “corroboration of original evidence”①, for example, the simultaneous consideration of “discourses/counterdiscourses” in the previous text effectively overcomes the negative results of “polarized thinking.”
Last but foremost, the “influence study” and the “parallel study” must never be placed in simple
opposition (as the academics of comparative literature always do). Instead, it must be realized that the two
are in fact mutually dependent and complementary. the author believes that “parallel study” especially needs
“influence study” which emphasizes cause-and-effect links to enhance its foundation (this point will be
expounded in another paper).
Surely it also must be noted that the cross-cultural parallel studies conducted by sinologists are closely
linked to “pre-understanding” elements such as their own cultural identity and national stance. Though
sometimes hidden, this could play a crucial part. Take Max Weber, Benjamin Schwartz, Joseph R. Levenson
and Thomas A. Metzger -- all four are sinologists with the strongest sense of problematics -- for example.
They are all Jews and Jewish culture is ingrained in their understanding of Chinese thoughts (they are always
possessed by an “empathetic” cognition, which induces them to project their thoughts and feelings about their
own national culture and time in their studies of Chinese culture). Determining the mechanism of how this
influence works will be a great challenge to relevant study. Moreover, sinologists conduct comparative study
mainly in order to enlighten Western readers, and even to solve problems in the West (never those in China).
In that manner, on the one hand, the understanding of Chinese classics will be attained in the entanglement of
two or even multiple cultural contexts, and on the other hand, modern Euro-American sinologists will share
a certain realm of western knowledge and issues. Discussions and diverse opinions will arise in the field,
forming their own curve of development and map of connections. To sort out those connections, one must
be a very good searcher and reader of multilingual documents written in major European languages such as
French, German and English. This will be an even bigger, deeper and harder challenge.
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